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In the context of a debtor-landlord, section 363(f) can be invoked to extinguish the
interests of unwanted tenants in the debtor-landlord’s real property; thus “embod[ying] the
general Bankruptcy Code policy of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”4 Obviously,
permitting such a 363 sale would adversely affect the interests of tenants who expect to continue
occupying the leased premises. Cognizant of this tension, courts have yet to reach a unanimous
decision permitting a “free and clear” sale of leasehold interests due to the existence of section
365(h) governing the assumption and rejection of leases.5
When a debtor-landlord or trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property, section
365(h) allows the non-debtor tenant to either: (i) treat the lease as terminated and file a claim for
breach; or (ii) “retain its rights under such lease . . . that are in or appurtenant to the real property
for the balance of the term of such lease and for any renewal or extension of such rights.”6 In
permitting a debtor-lessor to reject an undesirable lease, section 365(h) simultaneously protects
the lessee’s property rights providing the lessee with certain statutory protections such as the
right to stay. Id. Furthermore, after rejection of a lease, the debtor-lessor is not required to
perform the covenants under the lease, but the lessee is entitled to offset the damages caused by
nonperformance against rent.7 In enacting section 365(h), lawmakers sought to codify a delicate
balance between the rights of a debtor-lessor and the rights of its tenants “by preserving the
parties’ expectations in a real estate transaction.”8

3

See Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 2003).
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991).
5
11 U.S.C. § 365. See IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. Polo N. Country Club, Inc., No. CV 16-8683 (MAS), 2017 WL
4927667, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2017) (“[A]cknowledge[ing] the split between various courts regarding whether a
debtor–lessor may sell real property free and clear under Section 363(f) and strip a lessee of its rights under Section
365(h).”).
6
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A).
7
Id. § 365(h)(1)(B).
8
See In re Lee Road Partners, Ltd., 155 B.R. 55, 60 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[R]ejection by a debtor-lessor does
not terminate the lease so completely as to divest the lessee of his estate in property.”).
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Absent judicial resolution of the issue or legislative clarification, it is unclear whether a
debtor-landlord may sell real property “free and clear” under section 363(f) and strip a lessee of
its statutory rights under section 365(h). This memorandum explores this issue in a threefold
approach. Part I addresses how courts construe “any interest in such property” under section
363(f). Part II discusses the apparent conflict between section 363(f) and section 365(h) of the
Bankruptcy Code by examining the majority and minority positions. Part III concludes by
analyzing the implications of these interpretations in the context of the landlord-tenant
relationship whereby adequate protection must be demanded.
I.

“Interest In Such Property” Includes Leasehold Interests

Because the Bankruptcy Code lacks a definition of the phrase “interest in property,”
courts have struggled to determine whether particular rights asserted by a party satisfy the
statutory requirement. Section 363(f) provides that the trustee may sell property “free and clear
of any interest in such property.”9 In defining “interest” in other sections of the Bankruptcy
Code, “interests in property” are creatures of state law in the absence of any controlling federal
law.10 In the context of section 363(f), the term “any interest in property” encompasses those
claims that are connected to or arise from the property being sold.11
Under the expansive interpretation of “any interest” in section 363(f), possessory rights
of lessees fall within the scope of the section.12 In In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York
City, Inc., the parties disputed whether the term “any interest” included the defendant’s asserted
right to obtain leases.13 Having asserted that right after the section 363 sale took place and title
transferred, the court held that any interest that defendants had in their leasehold was
9

11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992).
11
See Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009).
12
See In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City, Inc., No. M-47 (JSM), 2000 WL 744126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 9, 2000).
13
Id.
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American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

extinguished upon the sale of the debtor’s property.14 Thus, a tenant’s leasehold interest must be
within the scope of section 363(f) if it is extinguishable upon the transfer of title.
II.

The Application of Section 365(h) Protections or Section 363(f) “Free and Clear” Sales
A. Majority Rule: A Trustee’s Ability to Sell Property “Free and Clear” of Third Party Interests
is Subject to a Tenant’s Section 365(h) Rights to Stay

The majority of courts have found that section 363(f) and section 365(h) conflict, and that
the rights of non-debtor lessees provided by section 365(h) prevail over a trustee’s ability to sell
property “free and clear” of third-party interests.15 To reconcile the conflict between section
363(f) and section 365(h), courts have applied the canon of statutory construction which instructs
that “specific statutory provisions should prevail over more general provisions.”16 Because
section 365(h) gives lessees the right to retain possession of leased real property notwithstanding
rejection of the lease, lessees may also retain possession following a “free and clear” sale under
section 363 when the lease has not been rejected.17 If the conflict between the two sections were
resolved in favor of section 363(f), then the application of section 365(h) as it relates to nondebtor lessees would be rendered meaningless, leaving lessees unprotected when a landlord files
for bankruptcy.18
Moreover, a lessees’ interest is not necessarily terminated even upon the rejection of a
lease or executory contract.19 In Taylor, the chapter 11 debtor sought to sell real property “free
and clear” of various interests including recorded leases under which tenants operated various
nursing home facilities.20 The court held that the debtor’s ability to sell the property “free and

14

Id.
See Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1, 8–10
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
16
In re Churchill Properties III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 167 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996).
20
Id. at 144.
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clear” was subject to the lessee’s section 365(h) right to stay. The court reasoned that because
section 365(h) was specifically tailored to deal with the rights of debtor-landlords and non-debtor
lessees, section 365(h) should be the sole provision to govern a landlord-tenant relationship.21
Thus, a debtor-landlord would be required to assume or reject a lease prior to a court approving a
section 363 sale because if a lease is rejected, the lessee then has the option to treat the rejection
as a breach or to remain in possession.22
Furthermore, a debtor should not be permitted to dispossess a tenant through a “free and
clear” sale because it would be “doing indirectly what it could not do directly” under section
365(h).23 In In re Haskell, the court held that a debtor was unable to terminate a ninety-nine year
lease through the operation of section 363(f).24 Notably, the debtor could not compel the lessee
to accept monetary compensation in exchange for the rejection of its lease.25 The court reasoned
that even if the debtor fulfilled the requirements of section 363(f), the lessee would still have the
right under section 365(h) to remain in possession of its leasehold interest.26
In In re Revel AC, Inc., the terms of the lease allowed the tenant to operate in three
venues rent-free unless the tenant’s operation was profitable as set forth in a “recoupment
provision” in the lease.27 When the debtor-landlord rejected the unexpired lease and the property
was sold at the bankruptcy auction, the court entered an order selling the property “free and
clear” of any interest but provided that the tenant retained its rights under the lease to the extent
allowed by section 365(h).28 The Third Circuit held that under the order permitting the section
363 sale, and by virtue of the tenant’s election under section 365(h), the tenant was entitled to
21

Id. at 164.
Id.
23
See In re Haskell, 321 B.R. at 9.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 9.
26
Id.
27
See Revel AC, Inc. v. Revel Entm’t Grp., LLC (In re Revel AC, Inc.), 909 F.3d 597, 603 (3d Cir. 2018).
28
Id. at 600.
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continue paying rent on the same terms under the lease even after its landlord rejected the lease
and sold the premises.29 While the court noted that equitable recoupment is an affirmative
defense and not an interest extinguishable under section 363(f), the lessee was entitled to reduce
its rental obligations regardless of whether its rights arose before or after the debtor filed its
bankruptcy petition or rejected the lease.30 Thus, in the majority of cases, section 363(f) does not
permit a landlord-debtor to sell estate property free and clear of leases or its possessory interest.
B. Minority Rule: Section 363(f) Rights to Sell Property “Free and Clear” of “Any Interest”
Supersedes Section 365(h) Right to Stay

A minority of courts have found that the application of section 365(h) is limited to when
a debtor-landlord remains in possession of its property and rejects a lease.31 Moreover, section
365(h) does not grant the lessee special rights; it merely protects the lessee’s existing appurtenant
rights if and when the lease is rejected.32
When a debtor-lessor sells property pursuant to section 363(f), section 365(h) is
inapplicable because the terms of section 365(h) do not supersede or limit the terms of section
363(f).33 In Qualitech Steel, section 363 authorized the “free and clear” sale of all interests and
the lessee neither objected nor sought adequate protection of its interest.34 Thus, the court held
that the section 363 “free and clear” sale extinguished the lessee’s possessory interest in the
property under the lease.35 The court reasoned that section 363(f) confers a right to sell property
“free and clear” of any interest without excepting from that authority leases entitled to the

29

Id. at 602.
Id. at 604.
31
See e.g., In re Downtown Ath. Club of N.Y. City, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7917, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
32
Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 707–08.
33
See Precision Indus., Inc., 327 F.3d at 547; see also South Motor Co. of Dade County v. Carter-Prichett-Hodges,
Inc. (In re MMH Automotive Group), 385 B.R. 347, 366 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Had Congress intended the
protections of section 365(h) to apply without limitation even when the property subject to the lease is sold,
Congress could have made that clear. This omission . . . is telling.”).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 541.
30
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protections of section 365(h).36 On the contrary, the plain language of section 365(h) suggests
that it has a more limited scope as it focuses on a specific type of event: the rejection of an
executory contract by the trustee or debtor-in-possession.37 Thus, because section 365(h) defines
the rights of parties affected by the rejection of a lease and makes no reference at all about sales
of estate property, section 365(h) and section 363(f) apply to different situations.38
Moreover, “[w]here there is a sale, but no rejection (or a rejection, but no sale), there is
no conflict.”39 In Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, the bankruptcy court authorized a 363 sale of
the debtor’s resort property.40 The trustee satisfied the statutory requirements of section 363(f)(1)
and the tenants failed to request adequate protection of their leasehold interests.41 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held that section 365(h) does not act as an absolute bar to extinguishing a tenant’s
leasehold interest in a section 363 sale.42 The court noted that no party was seeking to reject the
lease and because the leases were not rejected prior to the sale, section 365(h) was never
triggered.43 However, the court noted a “case-by-case, fact-intensive, totality of the
circumstances approach, rather than a bright line rule” should guide whether section 363(f) or
section 365(h) governs.44
III.

Raising the Issue of Adequate Protection Under Section 363(e) may avoid the Conflict
between Section 363(f) and Section 365(h)

Section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon the request of an entity that
has an “interest” in property proposed to be sold by the trustee or debtor-in-possession, the court
“shall prohibit or condition” the sale “as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such
36

Id. at 547.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Matter of Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2017).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 900.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 897.
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interest.”45 Section 361 provides three non-exclusive forms of adequate protection, including
periodic cash payments to protect against any decrease in value of the interest, an additional or
replacement lien, or other relief such as an administrative expense claim.46 Notably, the broad
definition of adequate protection in section 363(e) provides a “powerful check on potential
abuses of free and clear sales.”47
Moreover, adequate protection demands that the lessee be compensated for the value of
its leasehold.48 The court explained that section 363(e) protects lessees in allowing them to
petition bankruptcy courts to “prohibit or condition such . . . sale . . . as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest.”49 Thus, if a lessee asserts its right to protection, the
Seventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court is obligated to ensure that a lessee’s interests are
adequately protected.50
However, section 363(e) is focused upon protecting the entity whose interest is
threatened, not other creditors or the purchaser.51 In Dishi, as part of the debtor’s reorganization
plan, the debtor sought to sell a property to Dishi “free and clear” of third party interests under
363(f) and to reject all leases.52 Prior to entering the sale order, a lessee of the property submitted
a letter to the bankruptcy court asserting its section 365(h) right to stay.53 The bankruptcy court
approved the auction sale to Dishi but held that the objecting lessee had a right to remain in
possession of the property for the duration of the lease.54 Dishi then appealed to the district

45

11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
Id. § 361.
47
Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 862 F.3d at 900.
48
See Precision Indus., Inc., 327 F.3d at 548.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 711.
52
Id. at 700.
53
Id.
54
Id.
46
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court.55 Considering the role of section 365(h) in isolation, the court found that the only right
section 365(h) provides to the lessee is to maintain the rights that are appurtenant to the leasehold
in the event a debtor exercises his rejection powers.56 However, bankruptcy courts must provide
“adequate protection” which may include the unquestionable equivalent of the threatened
entity’s interest, namely, continued possession.57 The court reasoned that where it is improbable
that a lessee will receive any compensation for its interest from the proceeds of a sale and when
it is difficult to value the lessee’s unique property interest, “adequate protection can be achieved
only through continued possession of the leased premises.”58
Conclusion
Courts remain split on whether section 363(f) and section 365(h) are in conflict with each
other. The majority view limits a trustee’s ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party
interests by the non-debtor lessee protections specifically afforded by section 365(h).
Conversely, the minority view permits leasehold interests and possessory rights under section
365(h) to be extinguished by a “free and clear” sale of property under section 363(f). However,
when tenants raise the issue of adequate protection under section 363(e), or elect to retain their
rights under section 365(h) at the bankruptcy court level, it is likely that tenants will receive
some form of protection on account of their leasehold interest. However, when the retention of
possession has been granted, the appropriate form of adequate protection in the landlord-tenant
relationship remains ambiguous.

55

Id.
Id. at 705–06.
57
Id. at 711.
58
Id. at 711–12.
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